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The short answer to this question is yes (Afghanistan) and
probably (Pakistan). But short answers belie the legal complexities
involved in reaching those conclusions. The ultimate answer is
only valid if numerous other questions concerning who is being
targeted, where they are being targeted, and by whom these drones
are operated are also satisfactorily answered.
There is one aspect of this question that is not legally complex,
however, and that is the general legality of drones. In spite of the
Terminator-like creepiness that many have associated with machines
making war on men,' there is a broad agreement among those who
have seriously addressed this question that there is nothing
inherently illegal about using drones as weapons of war.' Nor is
t Michael W. Lewis is Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University
School of Law. He flew F-14's for the Navy from 1989-93 and graduated from
Topgun in 1992. I would like to thank Amos Guiora of the University of Utah
School of Law for reviewing this essay and offering comments.
1. See, e.g., Michael W. Lewis & Benjamin Wizner, Predator Drones & Targeted
Killings - Podcast, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/pubid.2083/pub-detail.asp.
2. See, e.g., Rise of the Drones II: Examining the Legality of Unmanned Targeting:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'1 Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. (Apr. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Drones l]
(statements of David W. Glazier, Professor, Loyola Law Sch.; L.A, Michael W.
Lewis, Professor, Ohio Northern Univ., Pettit Coll. of Law; Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Professor, Univ. of Notre Dame), see also Rise of the Drones: Unmanned Systems and the
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there anything legally unique about the use of unmanned drones
as a weapons-delivery platform that requires the creation of new or
different laws to govern their use. As with any other attack
launched against enemy forces during an armed conflict, the use of
drones is governed by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) .
Compliance with IHL governing aerial bombardment, which
requires that all attacks demonstrate military necessity and comply
with the principle of proportionality, is sufficient to ensure the
legality of drone strikes. In circumstances where a strike by a
helicopter, an F-15, or a B-2 would be legal, the use of a drone
would be equally legitimate. However, this legal parity does not
answer three fundamental questions. Who may be targeted?
Where may they be targeted? And finally, who is allowed to pilot
the drones and determine which targets are legally appropriate?
I. WHO MAY BE TARGETED?
To answer the question "who may be targeted?" it is necessary
to understand how IHL classifies individuals. As a starting point,
IHL considers all people to be civilians unless or until they take
affirmative steps to change that status. Civilians are immune from
attack and may not be targeted unless they take actions to change
4
their status and forfeit that immunity.
From a legal standpoint, the most advantageous way for a
civilian to change his or her status is to become a combatant. This
cannot be done by merely picking up a weapon, however. In order
to become a combatant an individual must be a member of the
Future of War: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'1 Sec. and Foreign Affairs of the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. (Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter
Drones] (statement of Kenneth Anderson, Professor, Wash. Coll. of Law), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1579411.
3. International Humanitarian Law is the term given to the body of law that
governs armed conflicts. It is also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) and encompasses the Geneva and Hague Conventions, the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, and the customary law that has developed
around these treaties.
4. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949,
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. Although the United States
has not ratified Protocol I, it recognizes much of Protocol I as descriptive of
customary international law. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633
(2006).
5022 [Vol. 37:5
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"armed forces of a Party to a conflict."5 This definition is found in
Article 43 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions
which goes on to define the term "armed forces" as:
[A]ll organized armed forces, groups and units which are
under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is
represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall
be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict.
The status of combatant is legally advantageous because
combatants "have the right to participate directly in hostilities."'
This combatants' privilege allows combatants to participate in an
armed conflict without becoming subject to prosecution for
violating domestic laws prohibiting murder, assault, and the
destruction of property, etc. The combatant's conduct is therefore
regulated by IHL rather than domestic law, and the combatant may
only be criminally charged with conduct that violates the laws of
war.
Attaining combatant status is something of a double-edged
sword, however. While it bestows the combatant privilege on the
individual, it also subjects that individual to attack at any time by
other parties to the conflict. Because targeting of combatants is
based upon their status as combatants and not upon their
dangerousness, a combatant may be lawfully targeted whether or
not they pose a current threat to their opponents, whether or not
they are armed, or even awake. The only occasion on which IHL
prohibits attacking a combatant is when that combatant has
surrendered or been rendered hors de combat. While there is
some disagreement about whether combatant status exists in non-
international armed conflicts," that dispute is irrelevant when it
5. API, supra note 4, art. 43(2).
6. Id. art. 43(1) (emphasis added).
7. Id. art. 43(2).
8. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva 1]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 13, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
9. Protocol I only applies to international armed conflicts and there are no
provisions in Protocol II (which supplements Common Article III of the Geneva
50232011]
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comes to questions of targeting members of al Qaeda or other
terrorist organizations. Because combatant status is based upon
membership in a group that organizationally enforces compliance
with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict,
groups such as al Qaeda, whose means and methods of warfare
include deliberately targeting civilians, cannot claim combatant
status for its members. It should be emphasized that the behavior
of an individual al Qaeda member cannot confer combatant status.
No matter how strictly individual members follow IHL or how
scrupulously they distinguish between civilian and military targets,
they are never entitled to the combatants' privilege and may
therefore be criminally liable for attacks on members of an
opposing armed force.o Al Qaeda does not, as some have
suggested, have a "basic right to engage in combat against us" in
response to our attacks."
If al Qaeda members are not combatants, then what are they?
Like all people, IHL treats them as being presumptively civilians
who, as a general rule, are immune from targeting12 unless they
take affirmative steps to forfeit that immunity. There are two
affirmative steps that can result in the loss of immunity. One step
results in a temporary loss of immunity while the other in a more
permanent forfeiture. A civilian temporarily forfeits their
immunity for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.'
While the exact definition of what constitutes direct participation
in hostilities (DPH) has been much debated, clear examples of
direct participation include engaging in attacks and planting
Conventions and is applicable to all armed conflicts which are not covered by API)
for combatant status. However, much of API has been recognized as customary
law and may apply even to APII conflicts. See e.g. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630-32.
10. There is debate about whether the source of criminal liability for such an
attack is the law of armed conflict or domestic criminal law. Because military
commissions deal with IHL violations, the U.S. position has been that unprivileged
belligerency is a war crime. See e.g., Robert Chesney, U.S. v. Khadr (Mi. Com. Oct.
25, 2010) (Plea Agreement), J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://chesneyjnslp.com/2010/10/25/nationalsecuritylaw-united-states-v-khadr-
mil-com-oct-25-2010-plea-agreement (describing a war crimes plea agreement in a
potential criminal case). Alternatively, Khadr could have been tried for murder
under the domestic laws and procedures of either the United States or
Afghanistan.
11. See Drones II, supra note 2 (statement of David W. Glazier, Professor,
Loyola Law Sch., L.A.).
12. API art. 51(2), supra note 4.
13. Id. art. 51(3).
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bombs. The most comprehensive attempt to clearly define the
contours of DPH is the six-year study recently completed by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law.14 While this document does not
have the force of law, it is certainly viewed as an influential
description of what many scholars and human rights lawyers believe
the state of the law to be. By itself such a document cannot be
considered customary international law, but it may become so if
states alter their behavior to conform to its definitions out of a
sense of legal obligation.5 Because military reaction to the
interpretive guidance has contended that the definitions offered
16
are too narrow (i.e., that the ICRC considers that fewer people
and fewer actions constitute direct participation in hostilities than
the military might), the interpretive guidance should be viewed as a
baseline description of behavior that inarguably constitutes direct
participation in hostilities while the actual state of the law remains
less clear.
The more permanent forfeiture of civilian immunity occurs
when a civilian takes on a continuous combat function within an
organized armed group of a non-state actor. The ICRC describes
those civilians that forfeit their immunity on a continuous basis as
those "individuals whose continuous function involves the
preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations
amounting to direct participation in hostilities."' This
14. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 991 (2008)
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-
documents.pdf.
15. The creation of customary international law requires opinio juris, that is
that states alter their practice to conform to a norm out of a sense of a legal
obligation that they do so. See generally Ross E. Schreiber, Note, Ascertaining
Opinio Juris of States Concerning Norms Involving the Prevention of International
Terrorism: A Focus on the U.N. Process, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 309 (1998).
16. See W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC "Direct Participation in Hostilities"
Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
769, 802-06 (2010).
17. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 14, at 1007. It should be
noted that the level of involvement with an organized armed group necessary to
trigger continuous combat function (CCF) status is much greater than that
required to trigger domestic criminal liability for material support of terrorism.
Hence the use of military force against those that have forfeited their immunity by
fulfilling a continuous combat function would not significantly diminish the
2011] 5025
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classification is designed to deal with the farmer-by-day, fighter-by-
night tactic that a number of organized, armed terrorist groups
have employed to retain their civilian immunity from attack for as
long as possible. The Israeli Supreme Court confronted this tactic
in its 2006 opinion on targeted killings." While the Court
reaffirmed the "for such time as" language related to direct
participation in hostilities, recognizing that forfeiture of immunity
was not generally intended to be continuous, it did indicate that
those who organize, plan, and direct operations were legitimately
targetable on a continuous basis because of the continuous nature
of their participation. 9 Continuous combat functionaries can only
reacquire their civilian immunity by disavowing membership in the
organized armed group and ceasing any operations with that
group.
So the answer to the question "who may be targeted?" is: any
member of al Qaeda or the Taliban that continuously performs a
combat function or any other individuals that are directly
participating in hostilities against U.S. or allied forces for such time
as they are doing so. This would certainly include individuals that
directly or indirectly (e.g., planting IEDs) attack coalition forces as
well as any leaders within these organizations. It should be
emphasized that the fact that these individuals may be directly
targeted does not elevate them to combatant status. These
individuals are civilians who have forfeited their civilian immunity
by directly participating in hostilities or performing a continuous
combat function. They are not, and cannot become, combatants
unless they join an organization that enforces compliance with the
laws of armed conflict, but they nevertheless remain legitimate
targets until they clearly disassociate themselves from al Qaeda or
the Taliban.
extensive role that law enforcement continues to play in the conflict with terrorist
organizations like al Qaeda.
18. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Israel,
[2006] (Isr.), available at elyon 1.court.gov.il/files eng/02/690/007/a34
/02007690.a34.pdf [hereinafter PCATI].
19. Id. para. 34-40.
20. If these groups established a political arm (similar to Sinn Fein in
Northern Ireland) whose members solely participated in the political process,
those leaders could not be targeted. The groups in Afghanistan have shown little
inclination to engage in the political process.
5026 [Vol. 37:5
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II. WHERE ARE DRONE STRIKES PERMISSIBLE?
Some commentators have taken the position that the law of
armed conflict only governs the conflict with al Qaeda within
certain defined geographic areas.2' Reasoning that the whole world
cannot be a battlefield, they would limit the application of the law
of armed conflict to states in which the frequency of armed attacks
crosses a minimum threshold of violence. Some of those taking
this position claim that international law limits drone strikes to
within the geographical boundaries of Afghanistan alone.2 They
consider any operations conducted against al Qaeda outside of this
defined geography as being solely the province of law enforcement
and therefore subject to all of the provisions of international
human rights law. In the law enforcement context lethal force may
only be used if the target refuses to surrender after being given an
opportunity to do so or if the target imminently threatens to harm
others. Because drones cannot provide an opportunity to
surrender, and because demonstration of imminent harm is
practically impossible to establish for terrorists and particularly for
terrorist leadership (the primary target of drone strikes), those
advocating this geographic conception of the boundaries of the
battlefield conclude that drone strikes outside of this geographic
zone of conflict are prohibited by international law.
This geographic approach to defining IHL's scope differs from
21. E.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RicH. L.
REv. 845, 860-64 (2009); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Unlawful Killing With Combat
Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: THE LAW
GOVERNING LETHAL FORCE IN CONTEXT (Simon Bronitt ed., forthcoming 2010)
(Notre Dame Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, Nov. 2009); John C. Dehn
& Kevin Jon Heller, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L.
REv. 175,198-201 (2011).
22. The factors that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia used in the Tadic opinion are generally the ones cited for establishing
this threshold of violence and it is argued that the current situation in Pakistan
does not meet these criteria. O'Connell, supra note 21, at 858. But cf Jordan J.
Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones
in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 237 (2010); Laurie R. Blank &
Benjamin R. Farley, Characterizing US Operations in Pakistan: Is the United States
Engaged in an Armed Conflict?, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 151, 162-76 (2011)
(concluding that the conflict between the Pakistani government and the Pakistani
Taliban satisfies the Tadic criteria for establishing the existence of an armed
conflict in Pakistan).
23. See Drones II, supra note 2 (statement of Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Professor, Univ. of Notre Dame).
50272011]1
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the more traditional view, consistently held and practiced by states,
that the law of armed conflict goes where the participants in the
armed conflict go, no matter how far they are from the zone of
conflict or which side of a geographic line they are on. During
World War II at the strategic level the Allies struck German forces
in Algeria, Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, France, Holland, and Belgium
before striking German forces in Germany. The boundaries of the
battlefield were determined by the location of the enemy.
Likewise, at the tactical level commando raids and airstrikes against
leadership and infrastructure targets far behind any front line
where combat was taking place, and the shoot down of Admiral
Yamamoto's plane that was on an inspection tour of the rear areas
are a couple of examples of conduct permitted by IHL at some
distance from the zone of conflict."
Even as the paradigmatic armed conflict has shifted from one
contested by standing armies of nation states against each other to
one that is fought between non-state actors employing guerilla
tactics and nation states, state practice on this issue has remained
consistent.15 When non-state actors that are involved in a conflict
have attempted to find sanctuary by crossing a geopolitical line, the
state party to the conflict has consistently asserted (and exercised)
the right to cross that line to strike the enemy. Whether it is the
United States pursuing the Viet Cong into Cambodia, Colombia
striking the FARC in Ecuador, or Israel striking Hezbollah in
Lebanon, states have consistently asserted the right to carry the
fight to their enemies in an armed conflict, regardless of whether
their enemies have attempted to use international boundaries as a
sanctuary. While the International Court of Justice has, at times,
24. Prof. O'Connell claims that the Yamamoto shoot down today would be "in
conflict with the basic treaties that form the law on the use of force". Mary Ellen
O'Connell, The Choice of Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. NAT'L SEcURIY L. & POL'Y 343,
361 (2010). This claim, that in the context of an international armed conflict the
shooting down of a uniformed enemy officer in a military aircraft flown by military
pilots by unrefueled, land-based aircraft would be viewed as illegal by IHL today
because it was too far removed from the zone of conflict reveals the extremity and
indefensibility of O'Connell's position in this matter.
25. Because there is not a treaty determining how the boundaries of the
battlefield are determined, any legal norm must be the product of customary
international law. While court opinions and commentators may influence
customary law, it may only be established if it is supported by state practice taken
out of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). There is a distinct lack of opinio
juris supporting the proposition that an enemy may find sanctuary by crossing a
geopolitical line.
5028 [Vol. 37:5
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disagreed with such assertions, this disagreement is only binding
upon the parties before the court and does not constitute opinio
juris supporting the development of a customary norm prohibiting
such a practice.
More important than the lack of state practice supporting the
proposed strict geographical restriction on IHL's scope is the
incongruence of such a reading of IHL. One of the principal goals
of IHL is to protect the civilian population from harm during an
armed conflict. To further this goal, IHL prohibits direct attacks
on civilians and requires that parties to the conflict distinguish
themselves from the civilian population. It would seem anomalous,
therefore, to read IHL in such a way as to reward a party 2 6that
regularly targets civilians. Yet that is what is being proposed. As
discussed above, a member of al Qaeda who is performing a
continuous combat function forfeits his civilian immunity and may
be legitimately targeted with lethal force without warning. But the
proposed geographic limitations on IHL's application offer this
individual a renewed opportunity for immunity from attack.
Rather than being required to disavow al Qaeda in order to
reacquire his immunity, IHL's preferred result, the proposed
geographic restrictions allow the individual to obtain the same
effective immunity by crossing an international border to an area in
which it is known that law enforcement is ineffective. If he can get
to Yemen or Somalia or Sudan or the Waziristan region of Pakistan,
the al Qaeda continuous combat functionary could remain active in
the organization that targets civilians while enjoying effective
immunity from attack. IHL has manifested its clear disapproval of
terrorist organizations by denying them the combatants' privilege
and forfeiting their civilian immunity. A reading of IHL that would
grant these same individuals effective immunity based upon their
geographic location is not defensible.
Although the strict geographic limitation does not undermine
the legality of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, there are other issues
that might. Unlike the ongoing operations in Afghanistan, in
which the United States clearly has permission from the Afghan
government to continue providing military aid in its conflict with al
Qaeda and the Taliban, the Pakistani situation is more
complicated. It is clear that the Pakistani leadership would pay a
26. See O'Connell, supra note 21; Dehn & Heller, supra note 21.
2011] 5029
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steep political price for openly embracing U.S. military operations
on Pakistani soil. As a result, any permission that Pakistan has
granted the United States to conduct strikes on its territory has
been given privately. While it is impossible to know the extent of
private permission that has been offered, the fact that Harold Koh,
the State Department's Legal Adviser, specifically mentioned the
importance of respecting the "sovereignty of the other states
involved"2 in his discussion of drone strikes, is evidence that the
Obama administration takes this requirement seriously and is
presumably receiving the necessary permission from the
appropriate sources. This uncertainty as to the permission being
given by Pakistan is the reason for the "probably" answer to the
28question on the legality of drone strikes in that country.
III. WHO MAY DO THE TARGETING?
In order for an attacker to be free from any legal liability
associated with a drone strike, the strike must comply with IHL's
requirements (most notably proportionality, necessity, and
distinction) and the attacker must possess the combatants'
privilege. As discussed above, the only way to acquire the
combatants' privilege is to be a member of an organized armed
force that has an internal disciplinary system that enforces the laws
of war. Air Force pilots that conduct drone strikes clearly meet
these criteria, but CIA drone operators may not, and it has been
suggested that they are committing war crimes by engaging in such
conduct. 9
There are actually two distinct forms of legal jeopardy to which
30CIA drone operators may be subject. They can be viewed as
27. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Keynote Address
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, The Obama
Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s//releases/remarks/139119.htm.
28. It should be noted that there is a self-defense argument that could be
raised by the United States if Pakistan did not give permission for the strikes. This
argument was hinted at by Koh in his speech to ASIL. Id. It was also developed
more fully by Ken Anderson in his testimony. Ken Anderson supra note 1, and
Jordan Paust supra note 22.
29. See Drones II, supra note 2 (statement of David W. Glazier, Professor,
Loyola Law Sch., L.A.).
30. It is important to clarify that this applies to drone operators conducting
surveillance as well as direct strikes with drones. Conducting surveillance in
support of the armed forces would place operators in the role of a continuous
5030 [Vol. 37:5
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violating the domestic laws (prohibiting such things as assault,
murder, arson, etc.) of the state in which the strike takes place, or
they can be viewed as violating the law of war by engaging in
unprivileged belligerency. I believe that the majority of
international lawyers would favor the former view, that the
operators are potentially liable for domestic criminal law violations.
If that were the case then CIA drone operators could be subject to
trial in Pakistan or Afghanistan for harm caused by drone strikes.
However, the United States has complicated this analysis by
essentially endorsing the latter choice .3  By charging Omar Khadr,
a Canadian citizen fighting with al Qaeda in Afghanistan who killed
an American soldier during a firefight, with murder in violation of
the law of war and officially sentencing him to forty years in prison
32
pursuant to a plea agreement, the United States has made it clear
that it views unprivileged belligerency as a war crime.
The clearest solution to this problem is for CIA drone
operators to acquire combatant status if they have not already done
so. It is clear that CIA drone operators have received IHL
instruction from military lawyers since the beginning of the armed
drone program. However IHL instruction, by itself, is insufficient
to confer combatant status. They must also be subject to an
internal disciplinary system that enforces the laws of war. Whether
such a disciplinary system currently exists is uncertain, but one way
of ensuring that CIA operators would qualify as combatants under
IHL would be to incorporate them into the armed forces. Article
43(3) of Protocol I allows a party to "incorporate a paramilitary or
armed law enforcement agency into its armed forces" after
notifying other parties to the conflict. For such an incorporation
combat functionary.
31. See supra note 10.
32. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. Def., DOD Announces Sentence for Detainee
Khadr (Oct. 31, 2010) http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx
?releaseid=14023. Pursuant to the plea agreement Khadr will in reality serve only
eight years.
33. Ambassador Henry Crumpton, who was in charge of CIA operations in
Afghanistan in 2001-02, made it clear in his keynote address to the "Air and
Missile Warfare Manual" Symposium at the University of Texas-Austin School of
Law that the CIA armed drone operators had received IHL training and that the
program had some form of military legal oversight from early October 2001
onward. Henry Crumpton, Ambassador, Address at the Air and Missile Warfare
Manual Symposium at the University of Texas-Austin School of Law (Feb. 10,
2011).
34. API art. 43(3), supra note 4.
2011] 5031
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to be effective a clear chain of command would have to be
established (if it does not already exist) that enforces compliance
with the laws of armed conflict. Without this incorporation or
some other measure clearly establishing the CIA drone operator's
accountability for law of armed conflict violations, the continued
use of CIA drone pilots and strike planners will be legally
problematic.
IV. CONCLUSION
Drones are legitimate weapons platforms whose use is
effectively governed by current IHL applicable to aerial
bombardment. Like other forms of aircraft they may be lawfully
used to target enemy forces, whether specifically identifiable
individuals or armed formations, if they comply with IHL's
requirements of proportionality, necessity, and distinction.
IHL permits the targeting of both combatants and civilians
that have forfeited their civilian immunity by directly participating
in hostilities or assuming a continuous combat function. Because
of the means and methods of warfare that they employ, al Qaeda
and Taliban forces are not combatants and are not entitled to the
combatants' privilege. They are instead civilians that have forfeited
their immunity because of their participation in hostilities.
Members of al Qaeda and the Taliban that perform continuous
combat functions may be targeted at any time, subject to the
standard requirements of distinction and proportionality.
International law should not be read as placing blanket
geographical restrictions on the use of drone strikes. Such
restrictions are not supported by state practice and more
importantly, reading such geographic limitations into IHL's scope
effectively turns IHL on its head by allowing the least-privileged
individuals, terrorists that routinely target civilians, a means of
acquiring effective immunity from attack without ceasing to plan
and participate in terrorist attacks. Rather, the more traditional
understanding of IHL's scope, that it applies wherever participants
to an armed conflict can be found, should continue to govern the
conduct of drone strikes. The geographical limitations on drone
strikes imposed by sovereignty requirements, along with the
ubiquitous requirements of distinction and proportionality are
sufficient to prevent these strikes from violating international law.
Lastly, CIA personnel participating in drone strikes must take
5032 [Vol. 37:5
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss5/4
2011] TEN QUESTIONS: LEWIS 5033
the necessary steps to be classified as combatants if they have not
done so already. Until they attain that status they are not entitled
to assert the combatants' privilege against any domestic law claims
made against them for damage done by drone strikes. Even more
problematically, given the United States' current position that
unprivileged belligerency constitutes a violation of the laws of war,
CIA drone operators that are not subject to a disciplinary system
that enforces the laws of war could be viewed as committing war
crimes.
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